This paper examines the level of earnings management for large IPOs that provide earnings forecasts and those that do not provide forecasts in the IPO prospectus. Using a sample of 368 IPO firms listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1985 and 2012, we find that the level of earnings management is lower for IPOs that provided earnings forecasts, than for those which did not provide a forecast. This evidence is robust, controlling for endogeneity and sample selection. Further tests reveal that IPOs that provide forecasts outperform their counterparts in the long run, using various long term performance measures. Overall, our results suggest that earnings forecasts at the time of listing convey useful information to investors on the quality of the company listing in the market.
Introduction
Earnings management has received significant attention over the last few decades, due to its importance and impact on firms' stakeholders. For firms considering listing, this impact is exacerbated by asymmetric information between owner-managers and potential outside investors (Toeh et al. 1998a; DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik 2001) . Recent evidence in the earnings management literature has focused on the complex relationships between earnings management and governance (Jaggi, Leung and Gul 2009) , debt/diversification (Rodriguez and Hemmen 2010) , compensation (Ibrahim and Lloyd 2011) and failure rates (Alhadab, Clacher and Keasey 2015) .
In this paper, we investigated the relationships between provision of earnings forecasts at the time of listing and earnings management and more specifically, the motive of large Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in providing earnings forecasts and the value of such information to IPO investors. In the UK, IPOs are not required to provide earnings forecasts at the time of their listing and such disclosure is voluntary. However, such voluntary information assists IPO investors in making informed investment decisions (Chong and Ho 2007) . Disclosing earnings forecasts in an IPO's prospectus could be interpreted as a promise from the firm's management to potential investors following the official listing of the firm. An optimistic forecast could force managers to manipulate the level of earnings upward. Further, the risk of optimistic forecasts is that firms are likely to lose public trust and face difficulties when dealing with their suppliers and customers. Due to the risks associated with earnings forecasts and possible legal repercussions, US IPOs are not permitted to provide earnings forecasts at the time of listing (Teoh et al. 1998a ). The motive for small IPOs in providing forecasts and subsequent earnings management is documented 3 in the literature (Cormier and Martinez 2006; Cormier, Pascale, and McConomy 2014) .
However, we are not aware of any study which examines why large IPOs provide forecasts at the time of their listing. Typically, large IPOs are known to the IPO investors and the market; hence the incentive to provide forecasts is weak. The UK market provides a good setting for investigating this issue, since most large IPOs in UK generally provide earnings forecast in their prospectuses. Investigating the relationship between earnings forecasts and earnings management is important from the IPO investors' perspectives.
1 The London Stock
Exchange Listing Rules (Yellow Book) and the Financial Services Act 1986 stipulate the requirements for disclosure of earnings forecasts.
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IPO firms are associated with high information asymmetry and this could be mitigated by the disclosure of earnings forecasts at the time of listing. The issue of information asymmetry also applies to non-IPO firms. For instance, Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari & Zhang (2011) document that in the case of non-IPO firms, earnings forecast is an important source of information for market participants and reduces firms' asymmetric information. By implication, earnings forecasts provide valuable information to the investors and it is far more important that it is made available at the time of listing, due to limited information available about the firm prior to the IPO. However, using forecasts as a signal increases the risk of losing investors' trust, especially when the forecast error (i.e., the difference between actual and forecast earnings) is significant. A significant forecast error encourages investors to disinvest their holdings in the IPO firms concerned and could lead 1 We thank the referee for pointing out that understanding the relationship between earnings forecasts and earnings management is more important for retail investors than institutional investors. Typically, institutional investors hold portfolios diversified across a number of stocks. to a poor long term performance. We investigated long run performance using two measures: (1) buy and hold market-adjusted returns over three-years, post-listing, and (2) the Fama and French three-factor model.
Using a sample of IPO firms listed on the LSE Main Market over the period 1985-2012, we find IPOs that provide earnings forecasts manage the level of their earnings less than those that do not provide forecasts at the time of listing. 3 This evidence is robust using (i) accrual and real earnings management measures, and (ii) controlling for sample selection and endogeneity. Further, we find that IPOs that provide earnings forecasts outperform those that don't, using buy and hold market-adjusted returns and the three-factor model.
Taken together, our findings suggest that large IPOs that provide forecasts do not manipulate the level of their earnings upwards; instead, they use forecasts as a reliable signal of their quality.
Past studies in the UK on earnings forecasts examine the forecast error and its determinants, ignoring the implication of earnings management for these IPOs (Dev and Webb 1972; Ferris and Hayes 1977; Keasey and McGuinness 1991) . In Canada, Cormier, Pascale, and McConomy (2014) Cormier et al 2014) . Large IPOs are known to the market, attract retail and institutional investors at the time of listing and hence understanding the motive of providing forecasts is important for these investors, especially the retailers.
Our study contributes to the existing literature on earnings management, earning forecasts, and long-run performance. It extends prior research on the relationship between IPOs and earnings management (Teoh et al. 1998a) by showing that large IPOs providing earnings forecasts manage the level of their earnings less than those that do not provide
forecasts. In addition, we show that these IPOs have a better long-run performance, using various performance measures. Our results are important to short term and long term investors, and provide insights into the information conveyed in the earnings forecasts at the time of listing. Taken together, our results show that managers of large IPO firms that provide forecasts, do not behave opportunistically to manage the level of their earnings upward and they use it to communicate with outsiders on the firm's quality.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we review the literature related to earnings management; in Section 3, we discuss hypotheses, data and methodology; the study's empirical findings are discussed in Section 4 and Extension in Section 5, while the conclusion is presented in Section 6. 
Motivation and Past Literature

Motivation
IPO firms that provide earnings forecasts are more likely to have a stronger motive of managing earnings, when they are small (Cormier and Martinez 2006) . Announcement of earnings forecasts could put such firms under the compulsion of having to meet the target and failure to do so would have severe consequences for future capital raising. The costs of inaccurate forecasts include costs associated with loss of reputation, and they are significant for the IPO firms, since they have a tendency to go to the market for raising additional funds (Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik 1992) . It is also possible that IPO firms might voluntarily disclose information about future earnings prospects, whenever the perceived benefits exceed the costs (Dye 1985; Donotoh 1989) . Therefore, IPO firms are likely to voluntarily disclose only credible information, in order to avoid legal penalties for misrepresentation (Teoh et al. 1998a 
Earnings Management and IPO
Earnings management is a natural and corporate phenomenon in the market place (Liang 2004) . Information asymmetry between managers and existing or potential shareholders contributes to the earnings management. Teoh et al. (1998a) 
Earnings Forecasts Decision
Earlier studies have examined factors that influence the decision to provide earnings forecasts. Generally, owners/managers of a firm considering an IPO, have more information on possible success post-IPO, than potential investors or IPO investors (Leland and Pyle 1977) . Hughes (1986) provided a signalling model and suggested that retained ownership and disclosure about future cash flow are needed to convey managers' private information. Titman and Trueman (1986) report that the choice of an investment banker and auditor could be used to signal the value of the IPO firm. Managers provide earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry (Verrecchia 2001) . Hirst, Koonce and Venkataraman (2008) provide a summary of management's motives for providing earnings forecasts and the characteristics of forecasters versus non-forecasters. Furthermore, managers with equitybased compensation are known to provide earnings forecasts to avoid equity mispricing (Hirst et al 2008) . Hertnett (2010) documented that forecasts could be perceived as credible information by market participants. Firms with an earnings history may find it easier to provide forecasts at the time of listing, while firms with less earnings history could benefit from providing forecasts, because of the higher information asymmetry associated with such firms. Cormier et al. (2014) 
Data Description and Methodology
Our initial sample consisted of 417 firms that went public on the Main Market of the LSE between 1985 and 2012. Financial and utilities firms were excluded due to differences in their reporting and disclosure requirements (see Teoh et al. 1998 We estimated accrual earnings management using a cash flow, following the approach of, Hribar and Collins (2002) and Alhadab et al. (2015) . The cash flow approach has 11 minimal measurement errors, compared to the balance sheet approach. Information on issue price, IPO date, market capitalisation, and gross proceeds, among others, were manually collected from the prospectuses, as was the Accounting data from the prospectuses during the year of the IPO, while data for non-IPO firms were collected from
Datastream. We measured earnings management during the year of IPO instead of post-IPO, due to the problems associated with earnings management post-IPO (see Ball and Shivakumar 2008) . Measuring earnings management post-IPO is likely to be biased, because of the capital raised during the IPO, which has an impact on the firm's size. 5 However, due to the data limitation, we did not control for production cost manipulations.
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To examine the association between earnings forecasts and earnings management, we used the following logistic model: (1) Earnings forecast is a dummy variable taking the value of one, if the IPO firm has provided earnings forecast in the prospectus and zero otherwise. EM_index is one of the following measures of earnings management: (1) discretionary accruals, (2) abnormal cash flows from operations, or (3) abnormal discretionary expenses 7 . Size is measured by the total value of assets during the IPO year. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the total value of assets.
ROA is the operating income divided by the average total assets. Cash is cash flow from 5 See figure 1 Appendix 2, the earnings managements over -3 and +3 window relative to the IPO year.
6 See Appendix 3, the discussion on how earnings management is calculated.
7 Our measures of earnings management are similar to those of Alhadab et al. (2015 
Endogeneity and sample selection
IPOs firms that provide earnings forecasts could manage reported earnings (upward/downward) to meet their forecasts (Cormier and Martinez 2006) . If earnings forecast and earnings management are jointly determined, it is important to address the endogeneity between the two.
The univariate results in Table 3 shows that IPOs providing earnings forecasts are fundamentally different from those that do not. Further, only a small number of IPOs provide earnings forecasts at the time of listing. This indicates a sample selection problem and possible endogeneity between earnings forecasts and earnings management. To address the issue of endogeneity and sample selection, we used Heckman and Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. The following outlines how we addressed the selection and endogeneity concerns: In step I, we estimated the probability of providing profit forecasts 8 We manually searched the auditing firm for each IPO and assigned one if the auditing firm is one of the big four auditing firms. 13 using equation (2). The predicted value from equation (2) is converted into a ratio of probability density function to cumulative distribution function (i.e., Inverse Mills) and used to correct for sample selection in the IV regression.
Step I:
Step II, we used IV regressions to address endogeneity concerns related to the sample of IPOs that provide earnings forecast. In the IV regression, the earnings forecast is the predicted value from stage I. The determinants of providing earnings forecasts are similar to those of Cormier and Martinez (2006) . Further, we included inverse Mills ratio from step I to correct for sample selection and predicted value to address the endogeneity. Equation (3) specification corrects for sample selection and endogeneity concerns.
Step II:
The coefficient estimates in equation (3) are unbiased estimates. We used the SarganHansen Test for over identification and the Cragg-Donald test for weak instrument. The null hypothesis for the Sargan test is that the instruments are valid, while for the Cragg-Donald test, the null hypothesis suggests that the instruments are weak. Since the latter test requires a tolerable bias, we used a 10% threshold. 
Long-run performance
To investigate the long-run performance, we used two performance measures: (1) market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) and (2) the Fama and French three-factor model. 9 The first method computes BHAR over the three years' post-IPO, using monthly data, starting four months after the first fiscal year end adjusted for market returns over the same time horizon-similar to the method used by Teoh et al. (1998 a & b) . As a measure of robustness, we examined the impact of earnings management and earnings forecasts on BHAR calculated over one year, two years and three years respectively. We estimated the following model specification:
A positive and significant   would suggest better long-run performance for forecasters than non-forecasters. A positive insignificant   would indicate comparable long-run performance between forecasters and non-forecasters. 10 The second measure is the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. We computed monthly portfolio returns for IPOs that provide earnings forecasts and those that do not and ran separate regressions, as follows:
A significant and positive would suggest abnormal returns on the portfolios of forecasters/non-forecasters, while negative and significant indicates poor long-run performance for forecasters and non-forecasters. 9 We are grateful to Alan Gregory for providing us with the data on these three factors: risk premium, SMB and HML.
10 Table A2 in the Appendix shows that the correlation between earnings management and earnings forecast is not high and therefore there are no concerns over multicollinearity problem. Table 1 exhibit a large variation in sectors across the sample of IPO firms. Durable consumer, energy (oil and gas), chemical, and allied products were the least represented sectors for the full sample and sub-samples, whereas wholesale and business equipment are the two best represented, followed by the sector labelled others. This sector includes construction, building materials, transport, hotels, bus service, and entertainment. This distribution is consistent for all IPOs, regardless of the forecasts. It is evident from Table 1 that IPO firms are clustered in some sectors, while other sectors attract only a few IPOs. We include industry dummies in our multivariate analysis to minimise the clustering effect and or over-representation.
[Please insert Table 1 here] Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample of IPOs. The table shows that, on an average, earnings management varies between -0.020 and 0.042, based on our three measures. The highest earnings management measure is discretionary accrual earnings management, whilst the lowest is abnormal discretionary expenses. This is comparable with the findings of Alhadab et al. (2015) . In our sample of IPO firms, 27.4% 51% of the IPO firms in our sample are placing, implying that their shares are placed with institutional and high-net-worth investors. In the case of non-placing, the shares are sold to all investors including the retail category.
[Please insert Table 2 here]
The results presented in Table 3 show the difference in medians between IPOs that provide and those that do not provide forecasts at the time of listing. It is clear from the table IPOs that the firms which provide earnings forecasts tend to manipulate the level of 17 earnings downward, compared to those that do not provide forecasts. The difference in the medians' is statistically significant at 1% using accrual or real earnings management. It is possible that IPO firms that have provided earnings forecasts were not optimistic in their forecasts and hence the incentive to an upward earnings manipulation is weak. The table also shows that the characteristics of the two sub-samples of IPOs are different in terms of ROA, cash richness, maturity, and the level of underpricing at the time of listing. In addition, IPOs that provide earnings forecasts tend to sell more shares at the time of listing with positive market adjusted buy and hold returns, while those that do not provide forecasts, sell fewer shares at the time of listing and experience negative market adjusted BHAR. The difference in the median characteristics between the two sub-samples of IPOs is statistically significant at the 5% level. Overall, the results show that the characteristics of IPO firms that provide earnings forecasts are large and different from those that do not provide forecasts at the time of listing.
[Please insert Table 3 here] Table 4 reports the main test of hypothesis 1, which focuses on the relationship between the likelihood of providing earnings forecasts and earnings management. Unlike US IPOs, UK IPOs can provide earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. Hughes (1986) found that firms can mitigate information asymmetry by communicating private information to investors and disclosing of their firm's value. The results in Table 4 show that IPOs that provide forecast are less likely to engage in earnings management, as compared to IPOs that 18 do not provide forecasts. This evidence is statistically significant at the 5% level, using discretionary accrual earnings management or abnormal cash flows from operations.
Earnings Management and Profit Forecasts
However, there is no evidence to suggest a relationship between the probabilities of providing forecast and earning managements, when earnings managements are measured as abnormal discretionary expenses. Overall, the results are consistent with our first hypothesis, which suggests that firms that provide earnings forecast are unlikely to manipulate the level of earnings. It is also possible that IPOs use forecasts as a signal of their quality and to distinguish themselves from other IPOs. Our results show that there is strong evidence that large companies, as measured by the logarithm of total assets, have a high probability of providing forecasts to signal their quality. However, highly leveraged firms are unlikely to provide a forecast at the time of the IPO. This is consistent with Healy and Palepu's (2001) evidence that risky firms, which includes IPOs, are reluctant to provide forecasts due to litigation concerns.
Our results show that mature firms, as measured by age, are likely to provide earnings forecasts and experience lower under-pricing. However, IPO firms that are underwritten by reputable underwriters are less likely to provide earnings forecasts. This result is consistent with the findings of Titman and Trueman (1986) . Interestingly, the probability of providing a forecast is high, when the IPO firms use placing as a listing method. This evidence indirectly suggests that earnings forecasts are used to signal the quality of the IPO. Such a signal would enable the IPO firm and its underwriter(s) to attract institutional investors, whose involvement into the IPO process is critical to the issuing firm.
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[Please insert Table 4 here]
Endogeneity and sample selection
We assume that the relationship between earnings management and providing forecasts are exogenous. Nonetheless, Kasznik (1999) reported that earnings management is likely to prevail among firms that provide forecasts, compared to those that do not.
Furthermore, the author argues that providing forecasts motivates firms to manage earnings to meet their forecasts. Cormier and Martinez (2006) document a similar issue in the context of French IPOs. These evidences suggest possible endogeneity between providing earnings forecasts at the time of listing and earnings management. Another related issue is that our study examines the implication of providing earnings forecasts, while most IPOs in our sample did not provide forecast at the time of listing. Together, the above evidences indicate possible sample selection and endogeneity concerns. We address the issue of endogeneity and selection effect in the Methodology section (Section 3.3). Table 5 shows that the probability of providing earnings forecasts at the time of listing decrease by 33.5% for a unit increase in the retained ownership. High leverage decreases the probability of providing forecasts by 6.1%, while the size of the IPO at the time of listing increases the probability of providing earnings forecasts by 2.9%. The inverse Mills ratio is significant in Model 2 through Model 4, suggesting a sample selection effect. We do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid using the Sargan-Hansen test, but we reject the null that the instruments are weak instruments, using the Cragg-Donald test. Taken together, the results of Tables 5 indicate that IPOs providing forecasts at the time of listing manage their earnings less than those that do not, controlling for sample selection and endogeneity. We control for industry and year of listing to avoid possible year or industry effects.
Model1 in
11
[Please insert Table 5 here]
Extension Long-run Performance
To investigate the implication of providing earnings forecasts to the long term investors, we compared the long-run performance of IPOs that provide forecasts with those that do not. Table 6 shows the results of long run performance as measured by BHAR and the effect of earnings management for the three measures is examined separately due to 11 Table 2 in the appendix shows that our variables are not highly correlated, suggesting that our models do not suffer from multicollinearity.
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high correlations (please see Table 1A in the appendix). Panel A Model 1, shows that BHAR is lower for firms with higher upward level of earnings management at the time of listing. This evidence is significant at the 1% level, using accrual and real earnings management. The results are consistent with those of Teoh et al. (1998b) , who reported a similar effect for the US IPOs. Model 2 includes a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs that provide forecast at the time of listing and zero otherwise. The results show that firms that provide earnings forecasts at the time of listing outperform those that do not provide forecasts.
Difference in the performance is statistically significant at the 5% level. However, a dummy variable does not reflect the quality of earnings forecast provided by the IPO firms, while the forecast errors measure the reliability of earnings forecast. To address this issue, we used forecasting error instead of forecast dummy, measured as the difference between actual earnings reported immediately after the IPO and earnings forecasts reported in the prospectuses. It is evident in Model 3 that higher earnings management leads to lower longrun performance. Moreover, the results show that high forecast errors lead to poor long-run performance. This is because long-term investors become disappointed when the forecast error is high and hence sell their holdings. Such behaviour would drive the price down and lead to poor long-run performance. Panel B, shows the impact of providing earnings forecasts on one year, two years and three years BHAR, controlling for additional IPO characteristics such as size, ROA, retained ownership, underwriter's reputation, underpricing and auditor's reputation. BHAR measured over three years might overstate the impact of providing forecasts. Hence, we examined the relationship between earnings forecasts and BHAR over one year, two years and three years respectively. The results are robust and show that an upward level of earnings management leads to negative 22 performance as measured by one year, two year and three years BHAR. These results are consistent with those of previous studies (DuCharme et al. 2001; Chang et al. 2010 ).
Although providing profit forecasts leads to a positive performance, significant forecasting errors lead to a negative performance. Stated differently, better long-run performance for the IPO firms is not determined by provision or non-provision of earnings forecast, but rather by the quality of forecast earnings. In fact, IPO firms with high ROA and maturity perform better, on an average, than their counterparts. However, highly underpriced IPOs underperform (generate negative returns) in the long run, consistent with the findings of Ritter (1991) . IPOs that retained more shares at the time of listing do not seem to perform well in the long run, while those backed by reputed auditors tend to perform better. The evidence is significant, statistically but not economically. The intercepts in all models are negative, suggesting poor performance for IPO firms on an average. Overall, our results show poor performance for IPO firms, but IPOs that provide forecasts with minimum forecast errors, tend to perform well in the long run.
[Please insert Table 6 here] Table 7 shows comparison of the long-run performance of IPOs that provide and those that do not provide earnings forecasts, using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. We calculated monthly portfolio returns for all IPOs from 1985 to 2012. We then matched each portfolio return with excess market returns, SMB and HML to assess the longrun performance. Model 1 shows the results for IPOs that provide forecasts, while Model 2 shows the results for those do not provide forecasts. The intercepts from Models 1 and 2 measure the long-run abnormal performance. The estimated coefficients for alpha measure 23 the abnormal performance; it is positive for the firms which provide forecast and negative for those do not. IPOs that provide earnings forecasts at the time of listing have a positive alpha of 0.007 compared to a negative alpha of 0.0012 per month for firms that do not provide. This is equivalent to 0.7% when controlling for market risk premium, size, and growth. Overall, these results suggest that IPO firms that provide forecasts experience post abnormal returns, while those that do not provide forecast are associated with negative performance of 0.12%. Nonetheless, the positive and negative performance are weak and only significant at the conventional 10% level. Tables 6 & 7 both support hypothesis 2 that IPOs use earnings forecasts to signal the quality of the firm and not to exploit short term or long term investors.
[Please insert Table 7 here]
Conclusion
In this study, we examined whether (and to what extent) UK IPO firms providing earnings forecasts are likely to manage the level of their earnings. Our results show that forecasters do not manipulate the level of earnings upward, regardless of the measures of earnings management. We find that large-sized IPOs and those backed by reputed auditors are less likely to manage the level of their earnings at the time of listing. Further analysis revealed that poor long-run performance, using market adjusted buy and hold returns and the Fama and French three-factor model, is restricted to IPOs that do not provide forecasts.
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Our study contributes to the existing literature on earnings forecasts, earnings management, and long-run performance. It extends prior research on the relationship between IPOs and earnings management (Teoh et al. 1998a) , by demonstrating that large IPOs providing earnings forecasts do not manage the level of their earnings upwards.
Further, poor long-run performance of IPO firms is attributable to issuer's quality. Our results are important for IPO investors, who typically invest in IPO firms over a long period, and provide insight into the information conveyed in earnings forecasts at the time of listing. Overall, our results show that large IPOs that provide forecasts do not behave opportunistically to manage the level of their earnings upward; they rather use the forecasts to communicate the firm's quality to outsiders. Table 6 provides the results of the regression analysis for the full sample focusing on long-term performance, as measured by buy and hold returns. Panel A shows the impact of only earnings management and forecasting on BHAR measured over 3 years period. Panel B shows the impact of all variables on BHAR measured over 1 year, 2 years and 3 years respectively. EM_discretion is the earnings management measured by discretionary accruals. EM_cash flow is the earnings management measured by abnormal cash flows from operations. EM_discretion exp is the earnings management measured by abnormal discretionary expenses. Forecast is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the IPO firm provides a forecast and zero otherwise. Forecast_error is the difference between actual profit reported immediately after the IPO and profit forecasts reported in the prospectuses. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA is the operating income divided by the total assets. LAge is the logarithm of age. Retained ownership is the percentage of shares retained by the firm at the time of listing. Underwriter is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the underwriter is reputable and zero otherwise. Underpricing is measured as the difference between the first day's market price and the offer price, divided by the offer price. Big N is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the auditing company is reputable and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is buy-and-hold returns BHAR measured over three years post-IPO using monthly returns. The values in brackets are the p-values. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Appendix 2: The figure below shows the median earnings management for different measures over -3 and +3 around the IPOs. The figures show the earnings management for IPOs that provide profit forecasts and those that do not.
